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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by virtue of § 78-2a-3(2)(h), U.C.A.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
and
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting
Appellee's/Respondent's Petition to Modify Alimony on the basis that Petitioner's
increase in income represents a substantial change of circumstances not contemplated
when the divorce decree was entered.
Standard of Review: The determination by the trial court that there has or has not
been a substantial change of circumstances is presumed valid and is therefore reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard. Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App ^[47, 997 P.2d
903; Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, If 28.

RELEVANT STATUTE: § 30-3-5(8)(g)(i), U.C.A.
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new
orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances
not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a domestic case that was commenced nearly five years after the entry of a
decree of divorce. On March 31, 2003 Respondent filed a petition to reduce or eliminate
alimony that he was ordered to pay to Petitioner. (R. 92). The basis for Respondent's
Petition rested on the substantial increase in Petitioner's income since the entry of the
Decree. (R.91-95).
The trial court found that during the 5-year period from the entry of the Decree
Petitioner's income increased by 92% while Respondent's income increased by only 5%.
(R. 198). Based on these changes in the respective incomes of the parties, the trial court
opined that the " . . . difference in the increases is, by itself, sufficient to establish a
substantial material change in circumstances." (R. 198).
There is no dispute over the amount of the respective changes in income of the
parties. There is also no dispute whether these changes represent a substantial material
change in circumstances. Rather, the dispute is (a) whether these changes were
contemplated at the time of entry of the Decree; and (b) whether the word "permanent,"
as used in the Decree concerning the payment of alimony, was intended to mean that
alimony should continue indefinitely and in the same amount that was ordered in the
Decree.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner urges this Court to accept that it was well known at the time of the divorce
that she was pursuing a new career in nursing and that her income would substantially
increase. Based on that alleged fact, Petitioner further urges this Court to conclude that
such fact was contemplated and considered in determining the amount of the alimony
award. However, Petitioner fails to establish a link between what she believes was well
known by the parties and what factors the trial court actually used in determining the
alimony award.
The record in the trial court clearly shows that the alimony award was based on an
equalization of the parties' incomes. There is not a scintilla of evidence that the trial
court contemplated the potential or likelihood that Petitioner's income would
substantially increase. What may have been in the minds of the parties, and perhaps the
trial court, was never made part of the record, nor included in the Findings of Fact or
Conclusions of Law, nor part of the Decree. Without any evidence that Petitioner's
increase in income was contemplated, Respondent's Petition to Modify was properly
granted by the trial court.
Finally, Petitioner suggests that the alimony award should not be disturbed because
the Decree ordered the alimony to be "permanent." Petitioner's understanding of the
word "permanent" is misplaced. With respect to alimony awards, the word "permanent"
refers only to the term or number of years and not the amount. Further, this Court has
-3-

previously ruled that even an alimony award that is deemed permanent is subject to the
statutory authority of the trial court to modify alimony awards based on a substantial
material change in circumstances not contemplated at the time of the divorce. Therefore,
the trial court properly terminated the alimony award based on its finding that Petitioner's
income exceeds Respondent's income and based on its finding that Petitioner's increase
in income was not contemplated at the time of the divorce.

ARGUMENT
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting Respondent's
Petition to Modify Alimony on the basis that Petitioner's increase in income
represents a substantial change of circumstances not contemplated when the
divorce Decree was entered.
I.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Respondent's Petition to
eliminate alimony.
After a trial held on March 2, 2004, the trial court entered its Order terminating

alimony for Petitioner. (R. 197-199) (Addendum 1). In its Order, the trial court
expressly stated the law, its findings, and its conclusions. Id. For example, the trial court
stated the law on modifying a decree:
The law grants to the Court authority to modify a divorce decree. The
test is whether there has been a substantial material change in
circumstances justifying such modification. Not only must there be a
substantial change in circumstances, but it must be one not contemplated
at the time of the divorce decree.
(R. 197-98) (Addendum 1).
-4-

The trial court next made findings of fact on the respective incomes of the parties:
The evidence, at the hearing, established that the [Petitioner's] income
has risen to $4,192 a month, a 92% increase from the time of the
divorce. Additionally, the evidence showed that her expenses had
declined. The [Respondent's] income since the divorce has risen to
$3,742 a month, an increase of approximately 5%. The difference in the
increases is, by itself, sufficient to establish a substantial material
change in circumstances.
(R. 198) (Addendum 1).

The trial court then turned its analysis to the issue of whether the substantial increase
in Petitioner's income was foreseen or contemplated at the time of the divorce. Id. The
trial court found the following:
"A review of the Findings of Fact, the Decree and the transcript of the
stipulation of the parties [at the time of the divorce] does not establish
that future income from nursing was considered by the parties."
Id.

A. Petitioner's increase in income was not contemplated.
It is important to note that Petitioner offers no evidence that the Petitioner's increase
in income was foreseen or contemplated at the time of the divorce. Petitioner's Brief
contains only self-serving statements concerning the possibility that an increase in
Petitioner's income was contemplated. These self-serving statements were made by
Petitioner during the trial held on Respondent's Petition to Modify. Pet. 's Br. at 3 (citing
to Petitioner's testimony in the transcript of the trial on the Petition to Modify). It is also
telling that Petitioner offers no citations to the Record prior to the entry of Findings of
-5-

Fact and Conclusions of Law at the time of the divorce. Therefore, Petitioner relies
solely on the Decree and its supporting findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Petitioner fails to marshal any evidence in support of or in opposition to the trial
court's finding that " . . . the Findings of Fact, the Decree and the transcript of the
stipulation of the parties does not establish that future income from nursing was
considered by the parties." Simply put, Petitioner fails to identify or cite to any evidence
that Petitioner's increase in income was contemplated during the divorce proceedings.
There simply is no evidence that such an increase was contemplated.
Had Petitioner's increase in income been contemplated, Petitioner could have easily
expressed and articulated such contemplation in the Findings of Fact or in the Decree.
After all, it was Petitioner's legal counsel who prepared such documents. (R. 76, 83). But
those documents fail to contain even a scintilla of evidence that Petitioner's increase in
income was contemplated. There is not one word nor one phrase within the four corners
of these three documents that can reasonably be construed as contemplating any increase
in Petitioner's income. An examination of these documents makes this point clear.
At a Pre-Trial Conference, the parties entered on the record their stipulation for
divorce. An examination of the transcript of the Pre-Trial Conference ("Pre-Trial
Transcript") (herein as Addendum 4) shows that there was no contemplation of the
Petitioner's increase in income.
Petitioner cites only three times to the Pre-Trial Transcript. See Pet. fs Br. at 4-5.
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One of those three citations concerns debts relating to Petitioner's "education." In her
Brief, Petitioner states:
"The original divorce decree contained references to the Petitioner's school
loans for her recently completed nursing school. (R. 8414; R. 211, p.4)"
Pet. 's Br. at 4 (emphasis added).
However, there is no mention of "nursing school" in either document cited by
Petitioner. In the Pre-Trial Transcript (R. 211 at 4) (Addendum 4), there is only a vague
reference to debts for "her education." In the Decree (R. 84 f4) (Addendum 2), there is
no mention of "education" nor "nursing school" nor any mention of the word "school."
Even if "nursing school" had been mentioned, without more, it certainly does not show
that an increase in Petitioner's income was contemplated in setting the amount of the
alimony award. Merely mentioning a word or phrase does not necessarily show that such
word or phrase was considered in determining the amount of alimony.
Petitioner's only other citation to the Pre-Trial Transcript refers to the obvious
contemplation that a change in Respondent's income would be a basis for review of the
alimony award.
"Upon a change of circumstances to the [Respondent], where the social
security or his pension . . . or the disability is modified, or he obtains
employment in the future, that would be a basis for the court to review
the matter. . . with regard to the alimony award . . ."
Pre-Trial Tr. at 5 (R. 211 at 5) (Addendum 4).
Petitioner attempts to characterize the foregoing statement as a limit on what factors
could be considered as a basis for modifying the alimony award. Petitioner's Brief uses
-7-

the word "only" to suggest that the Decree and the statement made at the Pre-Trial
Conference were intended to restrict the conditions that could trigger a modification of
the Decree. In her Brief, Petitioner makes the following statements:
" . . . Judge Wilkinson ordered that the only change which could occur in
modifying the alimony award would be a modification in the
Respondent's income/benefits." (no citation provided)
Pet.'s Br. at 4 (emphasis added).

"Judge Dever did not take into account the undisputed evidence
presented at trial by both parties nor the part of the transcript of the
stipulation of the parties which limited changes in the alimony only
upon changes in Respondent's income/benefits. (R. 211 at 5)"
Pet. 's Br. at 5 (emphasis added).

". . . Judge Wilkinson ruled that the only basis to modify the alimony award
would be changes in the Respondent's income/benefits. (R. 84 P ) . "
Pet. 's Br. at 9 (emphasis added).

Petitioner also sites, in conjunction with the Pre-Trail Transcript, the sole paragraph
in the Decree that addresses changes in Respondent's income^enefits:
If unforeseen circumstances occur as to the amount of income received
by the respondent, because of changes in his disability and/or changes in
his disability income that the same shall be a basis for modification
and/or review of the alimony as the court deems appropriate at the time
and under the circumstances that exist at the time of occurrence of the
substantial change of circumstances.
Decree at 2 f 3 (Addendum 2).
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From the statements made at the Pre-Trial Conference and from the foregoing
provision in the Decree, Petitioner leaps to the unsupported and illogical conclusion that
"only" a change in Respondent's income^enefits can justify a modification of the
alimony award. That is, Respondent contends that by identifying in the Decree one factor
that can trigger a modification in the alimony award no other factors can be considered
for modifying the amount of alimony. That makes no sense.
Petitioner urges this Court to conclude that Petitioner's increase in income was
contemplated merely because " . . . it was well known by both parties at the time of the
divorce that the Petitioner had just finished nursing school and was starting her career as a
nurse." Pet, *s Br. at 8. However, Petitioner fails to link that knowledge, even if true,
with the actual factors that were considered by the court in support of its alimony award.
Without express findings or language in the record, it is impossible years later to know
what factors determined the final alimony award.
In Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, this Court stated the following:

We do not believe it makes for good law or sound policy to
have parties arguing years after the fact over what a trial court
may or may not have considered when making an alimony
award. Utah appellate courts have consistently required that
trial courts make adequate findings on all material issues of
alimony to reveal the reasoning followed in making the
award. Consequently, if a trial court knows that a party will
be receiving additional future income it should make findings
as to whether such additional income will affect the alimony
award. The court should therefore have considered how

-9-

[Petitioner's] future receipt of retirement benefits would alter
her future financial conditions and her ability to provide for
her own needs. It then should have determined whether her
future income would affect the alimony award.
Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47 ^20 {quoting Johnson v. Johnson,
855 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

In the instant case, if the trial court knew that Petitioner's career change to nursing
would produce a substantial increase in her income, it should have made findings as to
whether such additional income would affect the alimony award. Unfortunately for
Petitioner, the trial court failed to do so.
This Court also clarified the distinction between what was in the minds of the parties
and what a court considers in determining an alimony award:

The fact that the parties may have anticipated [a substantial material
change in circumstances] in their own minds or in their discussions does
not mean that the decree itself contemplates the change. In order for a
material change in circumstances to be contemplated in a divorce decree
there must be evidence, preferably in the form of a provision within the
decree itself, that the trial court anticipated the specific change.
Accordingly, if both the divorce decree and the record are bereft of any
reference to the changed circumstance at issue in the petition to modify,
then the subsequent changed circumstance was not contemplated in the
original divorce decree.
Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47 f21 {quoting Durfee v. Durfee,
796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
At the time of the divorce, Petitioner's attorney drafted the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and the Decree of Divorce. He had ample opportunity to articulate
what factors were considered in determining the amount of the alimony award and what
-10-

would or would not justify a modification of the alimony award. He was or should have
been aware that those documents contained no linkage between what may have been well
known to the parties and to the trial court and the alimony award.
The common knowledge in Bolliger is similar to the knowledge Petitioner contends
was "well known" in the instant case. In Bolliger, the parties had been married for 34
years when they became divorced. Id. at f2. Ten years later, both parties began receiving
social security benefits. Id. at Tf3. It is obvious that the prospect of receiving social
security benefits was well known by the parties at the time of the divorce. Nonetheless,
there was no evidence nor any finding by the trial court that social security benefits were
considered in determining the amount of the alimony award. Accordingly, this Court
ruled in Bolliger that the receipt of social security benefits represented a substantial
change in circumstances not contemplated at the time of the divorce. Id. at f20.
The instant case is similar. While it may have been well known, perhaps even
obvious, that Petitioner would likely realize a substantial increase in income, there simply
is no evidence that such knowledge was a factor in determining the amount of the
alimony award.
Petitioner fails to link the amount of the alimony award and the prospect of
Petitioner's increase in income. This is particularly troublesome since the record
consistently shows that the parties and the trial court set the amount of alimony based on
the equalization of incomes of the parties. An examination of the record follows.
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At the Pre-Trial Conference where the stipulation of the parties was entered on
record, the following statements were made by counsel for the parties:
"In any event, the amount of the monies, equalized, will be somewhere
between approximately $750 to $810 from [Respondent] to
[Petitioner]."
Pre-Trial Transcript (R. 211 at 3) (Addendum 4) {emphasis added)
(Petitioner's counsel stating, immediately after a discussion of the
various sources and amounts of income of the parties, the amount of
alimony that should be awarded to Petitioner).
And,
"My calculations are that the alimony might be $700 as to an
equalization of the parties' income."
Pre-Trial Transcript (R. 211 at 5) (Addendum 4) {emphasis added)
(Respondent's counsel stating a correction).

In the Findings of Fact the following statement is made:
"Because of the length of the marriage it is appropriate that there be an
equalization of income."
(R. 77 f 5) (Addendum 3) {emphasis added).
And the Conclusions of Law and the Decree state the following:
"Based upon the length of the marriage, the economic circumstances
between the parties including the respondent's disability it is appropriate
that there be an equalization of income. The respondent is to pay to the
petitioner the sum of $698 per month as alimony based upon her total
monthly income of $2,154 and the respondent's total monthly income of
$3,546 per month."
(R. 78 1f2) (Addendum 3), (R. 84 ^2) (Addendum 2) {emphasis added).

-12-

The evidence in the record is clear. The intent of the parties and the trial court in
setting the alimony award in the amount of $698 per month was intended to equalize the
respective incomes of the parties. There is no other basis suggested, indicated or stated.
"Accordingly, if both the divorce decree and the record are bereft of any reference to
the changed circumstance at issue in the petition to modify, then the subsequent changed
circumstance was not contemplated in the original divorce decree." Bolliger v. Bolliger,
2000 UT App 47 f21 (quoting Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct. App.
1990)). In the instant case, Petitioner's substantial increase in income was not
contemplated in the original Decree, since there is no reference to such change in income.

B. The word "permanent" does not limit the trial court's authority to modify
the alimony award.
Petitioner appears to rely on the word "permanent" to support her contention that the
alimony award could not be terminated. Petitioner misconstrues the meaning of
"permanent" in the context of an award of alimony.
In Bolliger, this Court analyzed the meaning of "permanent." In referring to
Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), this Court stated the following:
Thus, even though this court ordered permanent alimony [in
Munns], we approved the concept that receipt of social
security or retirement benefits could amount to a substantial
change of circumstances warranting a modification "upon
appropriate petition."
Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47 ^|18 (emphasis added).

-13-

In Bolliger, this court also discussed the trial court's reluctance to modify the
alimony award because the alimony was deemed to be "permanent."
The trial court also based its decision on the fact that the
parties had agreed to permanent alimony in the original
divorce decree, apparently determining that neither the parties
nor the court could modify the permanent alimony award.
However, even if permanent alimony is awarded, a later
substantial material change of circumstances not foreseen at
the time of the divorce can provide grounds for modifying the
permanent alimony "upon appropriate petition."
Id. atf21 {emphasis added).

Any notion that the alimony award could not be modified is misplaced. The trial
court has clear authority by statute1 and by law to modify the alimony award based on a
substantial material change in circumstances not contemplated at the time of the divorce.
The word "permanent" only refers to the number of years alimony is to be paid, not the
amount of the alimony and not whether it should be terminated if justified by a substantial
material change in circumstances.

II. Respondent is entitled to his costs and attorney fees on appeal.
If Respondent prevails, he should be awarded his costs and attorney fees incurred on
appeal. See Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47 ^|26 ("trial court may award attorney
fees in a modification proceeding"); see also, § 30-3-3(1), U.C.A.

1

§ 30-3-5(8)(g)(i), U.C.A., clearly authorizes the trial court to modify an alimony
award ". . . based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the
time of the divorce."
-14-

Although attorney fees were not awarded to either party by the trial court,
Respondent is entitled to have his costs and attorney fees paid by Petitioner for her failure
to abide by the decision of the trial court. In Carter v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904 (Utah 1978),
the ex-husband filed an appeal after the trial court partially granted a petition to modify a
decree. When the ex-husband failed to prevail on appeal, the Utah Supreme Court
awarded attorney fees and costs to the respondent and held the following:
There is an additional matter which deserves attention. In
regard to the proceeding below, the trial court ordered that the
parties bear their own costs and attorneys' fees, which ruling
neither party has contested here. However, the defendant
argues that inasmuch as the plaintiff was unwilling to abide
by the trial court's judgment, and that she has been put to the
necessity of defending this appeal, the plaintiff should have to
bear the costs thereof, including reasonable attorney's fees for
her counsel. We agree with the reasonableness and propriety
of her request. Therefore, the case is remanded for the
purpose of determining and awarding her such attorney's fees
as the trial court finds to be reasonable and properly incurred
on this appeal. Costs to defendant (respondent).
Carter v. Carter, 584 P.2d at 906.

At a minimum, Respondent's costs on appeal should be awarded pursuant to Rule 34,
Utah R. App. P.

-15-

CONCLUSION
The record clearly shows that the alimony award was determined by equalizing the
incomes of the parties. There is not a shred of evidence in the record to suggest that
Petitioner's substantial increase in income was considered or contemplated at the time of
the divorce. It is not what may have been in the minds of the parties or the trial court but
what is in the record that counts.
Although the Decree ordered "permanent" alimony, such word only refers to the term
of the alimony and not the amount. This Court has previously ruled that permanent
alimony is nonetheless subject to modification upon a showing that there has been a
substantial material change in circumstances not contemplated at the time of the divorce.
Based on the substantial change in circumstances not contemplated at the time of
divorce, the trial court properly terminated alimony to Petitioner.
Respondent also requests that he be awarded his reasonable attorney fees and costs
incurred on appeal.

DATED this 12th day of January 2005.

Michael A. Jensen (723Q) /
Counsel for Appellant/Respondent

Smith\Appellate Defense\Brief January 12, 2005
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Addendum 1

Third Judith l>fe*aict
API? 3 0 29G's
^

, SALS LAKE COUNTY

By.

Deputy Ctoik

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

CHRISTINE COREISSEN SMITH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER
Civil No. 97 4 9 0 0256 DA

vs.

ALAN BRUCE SMITH,
Defendant.

JUDGE L. A. DEVER

This matter came before the Court on March 2, 2004, on Defendant's Petition
to Modify. The parties were present and represented by Counsel. The Court heard
testimony, received documentary evidence and heard argument of counsel.
The law grants to the Court the authority to modify a divorce decree. The test
is whether there has been a substantial material change in circumstances justifying

such modification. Not only must there be a substantial change in circumstances, but
it must be one not contemplated at the time of the divorce decree.
When the parties divorced the plaintiff's income was $2154.00 a month and
the defendant's income was $3546.00 a month.
The evidence, at the hearing, established that the plaintiff's income has risen to
$4192.00 a month, a 92% increase from the time of the divorce. Additionally, the
evidence showed that her expenses had declined. The defendant's income since the
divorce has risen to $3742.00 a month, an increase of approximately 5%. The
difference in the increases is, by itself, sufficient to establish a substantial material
change in circumstances.
Was the substantial increase in the income of the plaintiff foreseen at the time
of the divorce? A review of the Findings of Fact, the Decree and the transcript of the
stipulation of the parties does not establish that future income from nursing was
considered by the parties.
Case law is clear on the issue of foreseeability. There must be some evidence
in the record of consideration of the possible effect of the change or it will be viewed
as unanticipated and therefore available for consideration as a change of
circumstances.
The Court finds that there has been an unanticipated change of circumstances

and that the change has been substantial warranting a conclusion that alimony should
be terminated. Alimony to the plaintiff is terminated effective March 2, 2004.

Dated this 30th day of April, 2004.

BY THE COURT

LA.
Distric

Addendum 2

IJpMf^£iiy J
FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

Randy S Ludlow #2011
Attorney for Petitioner
336 South 300 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-1300
Fax: (801)322-1628

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DECREE OF DIVORCE

CHRISTINE CORLEISSEN SMITH,
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 974900256DA

ALAN BRUCE SMITH,

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Respondent.

:

THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came on for pretrial on the 30th day of October, 1997
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, judge of the above entitled court. The petitioner was
present and represented by her attorney of record, Randy S. Ludlow. The respondent was present
and represented by his attorney of record, Jane Allen. The court having previously entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and now, based upon such and for good cause appearing
herein

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1. The petitioner is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the respondent which Decree shall
become final upon entry.
2. Based upon the length of the marriage, the economic circumstances between the parties
including the respondent's disability it is appropriate that there be an equalization of income. The
respondent is to pay to the petitioner the sum of $698.00 per month as alimony based upon her total
monthly income of $2,154 and the respondents total monthly income of $3,546.00 per month. The
alimony as to be paid herein is a permanent alimony.
3. If unforseen circumstances occur as to the amount of income received by the respondent,
because of changes in his disability and/or changes in his disability income that the same shall be a
basis for modification and/or review of the alimony as the court deems appropriate at the time and
under the circumstances that exist at the time of occurrence of the substantial change of
circumstances.
4. The Northwest Pipeline 401k has a value of approximately $190,000. The parties are to
withdraw from that account sufficient funds to pay in their entirety the debts and obligations owing
on the second mortgage of approximately $8,499, the Westminster-Perkins Loan of $228.00, the
Stafford Loan of approximately $20,000, the SLS Loan of approximately $2,112.00, the University
of Utah Credit Union Loan of $4,758 and the MasterCard of approximately $7,350.00 together with
sufficient funds to pay the taxes from the money withdrawn from said account. The parties will
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thereafter file a joint tax return for the year 1997 with the parties being jointly responsible for the
taxes upon said tax return.
The remaining 401k having a value of approximately $125,000 is such that the remaining
amount would be solely owned and held by the respondent on him transferring and giving over to the
petitioner all equity in the parties' home together with $5,000. The respondent would be solely
responsible for all tax liabilities associated with the remaining balance on the 401k with Northwest
Pipeline. As a result of the transfers contained in the Decree it would equalize the accounts between
the parties.
5. The petitioner is awarded as her sole and separate property the Prudential and AT&T
accounts together with all of her inheritances, her IRA's and her 401k free and clear of any claim by
the respondent.
The respondent is to be awarded the IRA of the petitioner's which is in the sum of $3,800 free
and clear of any claim by the petitioner.
6. The petitioner is awarded one-half (Vi) of all retirements, pension plans, annuities which
have been acquired by the respondent and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue for the
distribution of the same.
7. The parties have two accounts which have been maintained for the parties' child, Beth's,
education. Those accounts are at the University of Utah Credit Union in the sum of approximately
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$4,000 and a Certificate of Deposit at the University of Utah Credit Union in the sum of
approximately $5,200. Those items will remain for the parties' child's education solely.
8. The parties have obtained insurances during the course of the marriage. The petitioner will
remain as the beneficiary on the Oldline life insurance policy which has a face value of approximately
$100,000, policy number 5 1364551L, which is insuring the life of the respondent.
The parties will be joint beneficiaries on the Oldline life insurance policy which has a face
value of $40,000 policy number 5 168973 9L which insures the petitioner. If the parties jointly decide
to surrender the $40,000 policy they shall do the same pursuant to a written agreement and equally
divide the surrender value of said policy.
9. The home and real property that was acquired during the marriage by the parties and is
more particularly described as follows:
Lot 13, Lazy Bar No. 2 Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof on file and
of record in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office.
is awarded to the petitioner free and clear of any claim by the respondent. The petitioner is to pay
the first mortgage owing upon the real property and to hold the respondent harmless from the same.
10. Each party shall be responsible for their own attorneys fees and costs incurred in this
matter.
11. Each party is awarded those items of personal property they presently hold in their
possession free and clear of any claim by the other.
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12. The petitioner is awarded the automobile in her possession together with the debt and
obligation owing against the same.
13. The respondent is awarded the truck presently in his possession free and clear of any
claim by the petitioner.
14. Each party is required to sign any and all documents necessary to carry out the terms and
provisions of the Decree of Divorce.
DATED this

^

day o*&tecfa> 1998.
BY THE COURT:

00005197.98

5

Addendum 3

Randy S.Ludlow #2011
Attorney for Petitioner
336 South 300 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-1300
Fax: (801) 322-1628

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

5S_
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHRISTINE CORLEISSEN SMITH,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 974900256DA

ALAN BRUCE SMITH,

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Respondent.

THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came on for pretrial on the 30th day of October, 1997
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, judge of the above entitled court The petitioner was
present and represented by her attorney of record, Randy S. Ludlow. The respondent was present
and represented by his attorney of record, Jane Allen. The court having give preliminary rulings as
to various matters and based upon such the parties thereafter entered into a stipulation which was
deemed by the court to be equitable and just. Pursuant to the stipulation the respondent withdrew

his answer and allowed his default to be entered by the court. Now, based upon such and for good
cause appearing in this matter, the court makes these its
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties are residents of Salt Lake County, state of Utah and have been for more than
three (3) months immediately prior to the commencement of this action.

2.

The petitioner and respondent are wife and husband having been married on August 2, 1968
in Provo, Utah.

3.

During the marriage irreconcilable differences have arisen between the parties making
continuation of the marriage impossible.

4.

During the course of the marriage the parties had born as issue to them three (3) children all
of whom are now emancipated.

5.

Because of the length of the marriage it is appropriate that there be an equalization of income.
The petitioner earns from her employment and from her sales of Mary Kay cosmetics a total
monthly income of $2,154.00.
The respondent earns from social security the sum of approximately $1,359.00 and
from Northwest Pipeline Disability Insurance the sum of approximately $2,187.00 for a total
of $3,546. Based upon such it is appropriate that the respondent pay to the petitioner the sum
of $698.00 per month alimony.
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6.

The parties have acquired numerous items of real and personal property between them
together with stocks, retirement accounts, 401k's, all of which should be equitably divided.

7.

There have been numerous debts which have been acquired during the course of the marriage
including monies for the petitioner's student loans. The student loans were necessary for
petitioner to be able to earn an income. The petitioner had previously been a homemaker and
has only been into the workforce for a very short period of time. As such it is appropriate the
parties recognize and pay off the petitioner's student loans as well as their other debts and
obligations.
Now, based upon the Findings of Fact, the court makes these its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The petitioner is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the respondent which Decree shall

become final upon entry.
2. Based upon the length of the marriage, the economic circumstances between the parties
including the respondent's disability it is appropriate that there be an equalization of income. The
respondent is to pay to the petitioner the sum of $698.00 per month as alimony based upon her total
monthly income of $2,154 and the respondents total monthly income of $3,546.00 per month. The
alimony as to be paid herein is a permanent alimony.
3. If unforseen circumstances occur as to the amount of income received by the respondent,
because of changes in his disability and/or changes in his disability income that the same shall be a
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basis for modification and/or review of the alimony as the court deems appropriate at the time and
under the circumstances that exist at the time of occurrence of the substantial change of
circumstances.
4. The Northwest Pipeline 401k has a value of approximately $190,000. The parties are to
withdraw from that account sufficient funds to pay in their entirety the debts and obligations owing
on the second mortgage of approximately $8,499, the Westminster-Perkins Loan of $228.00, the
Stafford Loan of approximately $20,000, the SLS Loan of approximately $2,112.00, the University
of Utah Credit Union Loan of $4,758 and the MasterCard of approximately $7,350.00 together with
sufficient funds to pay the taxes from the money withdrawn from said account. The parties will
thereafter file a joint tax return for the year 1997 with the parties being jointly responsible for the
taxes upon said tax return.
The remaining 401k having a value of approximately $125,000 is such that the remaining
amount would be solely owned and held by the respondent on him transferring and giving over to the
petitioner all equity in the parties' home together with $5,000. The respondent would be solely
responsible for all tax liabilities associated with the remaining balance on the 401k with Northwest
Pipeline. As a result of the transfers contained in the Decree it would equalize the accounts between
the parties.
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5. The petitioner is awarded as her sole and separate property the Prudential and AT&T
accounts together with all of her inheritances, her IRA's and her 401k free and clear of any claim by
the respondent.
The respondent is to be awarded the IRA of the petitioner's which is in the sum of $3,800 free
and clear of any claim by the petitioner.
6. The petitioner is awarded one-half QA) of all retirements, pension plans, annuities which
have been acquired by the respondent and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue for the
distribution of the same.
7. The parties have two accounts which have been maintained for the parties' child, Beth's,
education. Those accounts are at the University of Utah Credit Union in the sum of approximately
$4,000 and a Certificate of Deposit at the University of Utah Credit Union in the sum of
approximately $5,200. Those items will remain for the parties' child's education solely.
8. The parties have obtained insurances during the course of the marriage. The petitioner will
remain as the beneficiary on the Oldline life insurance policy which has a face value of approximately
$100,000, policy number 5 1364551L, which is insuring the life of the respondent.
The parties will be joint beneficiaries on the Oldline life insurance policy which has a face
value of $40,000 policy number 5 1689739L which insures the petitioner. If the parties jointly decide
to surrender the $40,000 policy they shall do the same pursuant to a written agreement and equally
divide the surrender value of said policy.
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9. The home and real property that was acquired during the marriage by the parties and is
more particularly described as follows:
Lot 13, Lazy Bar No. 2 Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof on file and
of record in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office.
is awarded to the petitioner free and clear of any claim by the respondent The petitioner is to pay
the first mortgage owing upon the real property and to hold the respondent harmless from the same.
10. Each party shall be responsible for their own attorneys fees and costs incurred in this
matter.
11. Each party is awarded those items of personal property they presently hold in their
possession free and clear of any claim by the other.
12. The petitioner is awarded the automobile in her possession together with the debt and
obligation owing against the same.
13. The respondent is awarded the truck presently in his possession free and clear of any
claim by the petitioner.
/
/
/
/
/
/
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14. Each party is required to sign any and all documents necessary to carry out the terms and
provisions of the Decree of Divorce.

DATED this

<P^day <#Weh, 1998.
BY THE COURT:
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Addendum 4

Third Judicial District
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICTS C 2 fl 199?
SMftLAKE COUNTY

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: DIVISION f )£,,., i^u—,
CHRISTINE COREISSEN SMITH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Reporter's Transcript of Hearing
at Pre-trial Conference Proceedings:
Settlement Enunciation

Case No. 974900256

ALAN BRUCE SMITH,
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
Defendant.

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 30th day of October. 1997.
the above-entitled matter came on for hearing in the chambers area of Courtroom
No. 502 of the Courts Building, Metropolitan Hall of Justice, 240 East 400 South,
Salt Lake City, UT before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge in the Third
Judicial District, State of Utah.
APPEARANCES
JANE ALLEN. Attorney-at-Law. 310 South Main, Suite 1314, Salt
Lake City, UT 84101 Telephone 355-1300 Fax 532-6502 appearing with and on behalf

of thej^jfftffr. X> &

^e^^vdr/iZ-^fft^etct

RANDY S. LUDLOW. Attorney-at-Law. 336 South 300 East, Suite
200, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Telephone 531-1300 Fax 322-1628 appearing with and
on behalf of the Defentlant.
__ /K/

ORIGINAL

an

1

(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had in open court:)

2

THE COURT: The record may show that this is the time and place

3

for the pre-trial of this matter. The court has discussed the case with counsel; they've

4

talked to their clients; and they indicate they have a disposition. Who wishes to read it

5

into the record?

6

MR. LUDLOW: I'll do it; I'll do the papers. Your Honor, the

7

decree of divorce will be entered on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. There are

8

no minor children of the parties. All the children are emancipated.

9

As relates to residency, the parties have been residents of Salt Lake

10

County for three months prior to the commencement of this action. The parties are

11

disolving a 29-year marriage. We're going to be equalizing the income between the

12

parties. It would be based on — we're going to be reviewing that to make sure the

13
14

figures

are correct - but approximately the income to the plaintiff, from her wages, will

be $2114, and from her Mary Kay Cosmetics, $40 per month, for $2154.

15

And then from the Defendant, from Social Security approximately

16

$1359, and Northwest Disability approximately $2187 per month. And what we have

17

to check on is whether or not the dividends that have been paid over to the Defendant,

18

if they would be there in the future, based upon whether they come out of the AESOP

19

plan. If they're part of the 401K, if they're part of the AEOSP plan, it would be $250

20

a month. The basic difference is possibly $3,375.

2

1
2

In any event, the amount of the monies, equalized, will be somewhere
between approximately $750 to $810 from the Defendant to the Plaintiff.

3

The parties have mutual debts, and monies will be taken out of the

4

401K in order to pay off these debts in their entirety, including the second mortgage of

5

$8,499, approximately; the Westminster-Perkins loan of $228; the Stafford loan of

6

$20,000; the SLS approximately $2112; the University of Utah, $4758; and the

7

Mastercard of $7350. The amounts represent approximately $42, 947.

8

The parties will in fact file joint tax returns for the year 1997 and

9

be responsible jointly for the monies that are withdrawn from the 401K and ordered to

10
11

pay off these debts.
Additionally, there will be — the account, the 401K, will be

12

equalized, and it is presently $96,000, and the monies from that account — which will be

13

$96,000 to the Plaintiff- she will reimburse to the Defendant approximately $40,000.

14

Because of the fact that the parties will be filing joint tax returns,

15

those monies that will appear on it, she will be paying the tax that is incurred, the joint

16

tax return, for that $40,000 debt.

17

The inheritances that she will receive, which are presently held in

18

the Prudential and AT&T accounts, will be awarded to her solely. With the inheritance

19

that is approximately $3800 on the IRA, that would be awarded to the Defendant.

20

He waives any claim to the 401K, that she has, which has been acquired prior to her —

3

1

since the time they were separated, which is now approximately $5,000.

2

The parties have two debts — excuse me, amounts owing, of which

3

there is the U Credit Union of approximately $4,000, and a CD at the U of U Credit

4

Union of approximately $5200. Those have been for her education and they will remain

5

debts.

6

Additionally, there have been insurances that have been obtained

7

by the parties during the marriage. The Plaintiff will remain as the beneficiary on the

8

Old Lawn Life insurance, which is in the amount of $100,000, and it is insuring the life

9

of the Defendant.

10

The parties will jointly be beneficiaries on the Old Lawn Life

11

insurance of the $40,000 which includes — inures to the Plaintiff. If they decide to

12

surrender it under a joint agreement, they both will take whatever the monies are of that

13

particular account and divide that equally.

14

The Plaintiff will be awarded her — I'm sorry, the Plaintiff will be

15

awarded the house free and clear of any claim by the Defendant. She will be required

16

to pay the first mortgage on that home and to hold him harmless from the same.

17

As stated earlier, the equity is paid out of the — she's reimbursing

18

him for his equity in the 401K. Each party will bear the responsibility for their own

19

attorneys fees that have been incurred in this matter.

20

The Plaintiff will be entitled to one-half of the retirement pension

4

1

plans, that have been acquired during the marriage, of the Defendant. He'll be awarded

2

the truck that is in his possession; she'll be awarded the car and the

3

debt that is owed against it that is in her possession. The Caravan has been turned over

4

to the parties' son. Each party will be awarded the items of personal property presently

5

held in their own possession.

6

Upon a change of circumstances to the Defendant, where the social

7

Security or his pension — excuse me, or the disability is modified, or he obtains

8

employment in the future, that would be a basis for the court to review the matter.

9

With regard to the alimony award — .

10

MS. ALLEN: I have a couple of questions, corrections, to the last

11

one: That a change of circumstances would also be retiring. My calculations are that

12

the alimony might be $700 as to an equalization of the parties' income; that the $96,000

13

split on the IRA is its present value; and at the time we actually divide it, that could be

14

higher or lower, since there have been fluctuations in the stock market. We assume it

15

would be half. The other -- the qualified stipulation recovery pension, that's not that

16

one. I think that's all.

17

MR. LUDLOW: Yes, your Honor.

18

THE COURT: Let me ask the parties: Ma'am, you're the Plaintiff

19
20

in this action. You've heard the stipulation. Do you understand it?
THE PLAINTIFF: Yes.

5

1

THE COURT: Are you willing to accept it and live by it?

2

THE PLAINTIFF: Yes.

3

THE COURT: Sir, you're the Defendant.

4

You've heard the

stipulation. Do you understand it?

5

THE DEFENDANT: Pretty well. Yes.

6

THE COURT: Are you willing to accept it and live by it?

7

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

8

THE COURT: The court will accept the stipulation. Now, I sassume

9

that your answer and/or counterclaim may be withdrawn, and that they may proceed

10

to take the divorce?

11

MS. ALLEN: Yes.

12

THE COURT: Who's going to prepare the pleadings?

13

MR. LUDLOW: I said I would. I'll send them to Ms. Allen before.

14

THE COURT: Thank you. You may be excused.

15

THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, your Honor.

16

(Whereupon, the Defendant and and Defendant's Counsel

17

were excused from and left the proceedings; after which, the

18

instant proceedings continued in open court:)

19

THE COURT: Your client's been sworn. You may proceed.

20

(Whereupon, CHRISTINE COREISSEN SMITH, Plaintiff

6

1

in the above-entitled matter, and have first been duly

2

sworn to tell the truth, testified upon her oath as follows:)

3
4

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. LUDLOW:

5

Q

Please state your name and address.

6

A

Christine Coreissen Smith, 2434 East Sundown Avenue, Salt Lake City,

Q

Ma'am, have you been a resident of Salt Lake County, state of Utah for

7
8
9

Utah,

more than three months prior to the time you filed this action?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

You allege in the complaint irreconcilable differences between you and the

12

defendant. Is that in the nature of the fact that, because of the disabliity, he becomes

13

violent and uncontrolled, and you have gotten to the point where you cannot live

14

together any longer?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

And given the fact of that disability, is there a real risk of danger to your

17
18

person, and to your daughter, too?
A

Yes.

19

THE COURT: The court does find that, based on the testimony of

20

the Plaintiff, there are sufficient grounds of divorce and does grant a divorce to the

7

1

Plaintiff, Christine Coreissen Smith, on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the

2

same to become final upon entry. Thank you, ma'am. Thank you, counsel.

3

(Whereupon, at the hour of 4:10 p.m., the instant

4

proceedings came to a close.)

5
6

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

7
8

I, Ed Midgley, Official Court Reporter in the Third Judicial District,

9

State of Utah, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing proceedings were, by me,

10

stenographically reported at the times and places herein set forth; that said report so

11

transcribed was, by me, subsequently reduced to printed form, consisting of the

12

enumerated pages herein appearing; and that said report so transcribed constitutes a

13

true and correct transcription of evidence adduced, testimony given and/or proceedings

14

had as at the instant proceedings hereinabove represented.

15
16

To which certification I hereby set my hand this 23rd day of
December, 1997, at Salt Lake City.

17
18
19

Ed Midgley, Official Court Reporter

20
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